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Country People Moving to the Cities:
The Migratory Dynamic
Sandra Poncet et Nong Zhu
1 The mobility of labour across the region is a key element in China’s transition towards
becoming a market economy1.  The process of change and modernisation, as China’s
opening up continues apace, depends upon re-allocating resources between industrial
sectors and coping with the inevitable shocks to production and demand. The mobility
of labour is the more important because markets in goods and capital are relatively
fragmented. Several studies have thus concluded that, in the course of the past twenty
years of reform, China has been transformed into “a fragmented internal market with
fiefdoms controlled by local officials”2.
2 This article will examine the dynamic for the migration of rural workers towards the
cities, using national data for the two periods 1985-1990 and 1990-1995. The article will
look at  the  restrictions  on worker  mobility—the main instrument  of control  is  the
system requiring each citizen to register for a residency permit, a hukou, for the area
where he or she lives. Despite a measure of relaxation in some provinces, restrictions
are still tight3. It will set out the available data and analyse the significance and the
defining features of interior migratory flows, concentrating on flows from rural areas
towards the cities, the areas most subject to restriction. It will also establish that the
migrations  are  taking  place  in  conformity  with  the  hypothesis  that  migrants  are
responding to wage variations and job opportunities.
The restrictions imposed upon migration and the economic reforms
3 Up until the mid-1980s, the mobility of the population, especially in the countryside,
was  strictly  controlled4.  The  original  purpose  of  the  restrictions  on  rural-urban
migration was to limit the size of the urban population, whose consumption of farm
products was extensively subsidised. For this reason, urbanisation in China has always
been severely curbed.  The anti-urban bias of  China’s  communist  leaders is  also the
corollary  of  their  condemnation  of  capitalism,  of  Western  values  and  of  counter-
revolutionary  forces.  The  cities  are  isolated  from  the  countryside  by  two
complementary measures.  Firstly,  a  high cost  in job opportunities  is imposed upon
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those leaving the rural areas by means of a system of work-points corresponding to the
days worked by a person living in the countryside (gongfenzhi). The system bases the
workers’ income on their participation in the daily work of the collective farm. Then,
there is the system for registering residence permits (hukou), which operates like an
internal passport system5,  establishing a direct link between place of residence and
access  to  consumer  goods,  job  opportunities  and  social  security.  Thus,  a  person’s
citizenship and residence are defined at birth, by the mother’s legal place of residence. 
4 “The system differs in terms of entitlements and details for urban and rural residents.
In a city, legal residence entitles one to local access to permanent jobs, regular housing,
public schooling and public health care (where almost all health care is public). Until
the early 1990s, it also entitled urban people to “grain rations”—rations of essentials
such as  grain  and kerosene.  Legal  residence  in  a  village  or  rural township entitles
residents to land for farming, township housing, job opportunities in rural industrial
enterprises, and access to local health and schooling facilities. Residents also have some
degree of “ownership” in local enterprises, although distributed profits all go to the
local  public  budget,  which  may  be  used  to  finance  ownership  housing  and
infrastructure. Again, until recent years, legal residence in a township also entitled a
‘peasant’ to some share in locally produced (or allocated from the outside) grain and
other essentials6.”
5 From 1984 onwards,  the system changed; migration became legal.  People no longer
needed a permit to leave, though they did need one to stay in the place where they
chose to settle. Yet, leaving one’s village is still expensive, since migrants arriving in
big cities have no access to health care, education or accommodation, other than at
prohibitive prices. So living conditions for migrants and their families are extremely
difficult. It  is  almost  impossible  for  them to find decent  accommodation,  and their
children have no access to education or to the health system other than by paying a
surcharge.  Other restrictions include the difficulties  in obtaining a legal  permit  for
migrating, problems in entering the labour market and various taxes and additional
expenses linked to migrant status. The cities bar some jobs to migrants7 and impose
taxes  on immigrant  workers,  such as  levies  to  pay for  the  fight  against  crime,  for
construction and urban administration, or even for women’s family planning advice.
The worst problems encountered by immigrants arise from the segmentation of the
labour  market  and the  absence  of  social  security.  Although these  extra  costs  were
officially abolished in 2001, some of them persist to this day. On top of everything,
migrants are sometimes still obliged to pay taxes in their village of origin on the land
that they have left lying fallow or for benefits they no longer receive. In some cases
they  have  to  pay  a  legal  fee  for  the  right  to  work  outside  their  original  place  of
residence.
6 The economic reform process that was embarked upon at the end of the 1970s has
radically altered the incentives to migrate. The reforms of the early 1980s impair the
efficiency of mechanisms for supervising the public8. Agricultural reforms, especially
the  end  of  the  people’s  communes  and  the  general  introduction  of  responsibility
contracts  (chengbao  zeren  zhi),  extend  greater  freedom  to  farm  workers.  Such
contracts allow farm workers’ households to profit from their fringe activities, thus
resolving  the  recurrent  problems  of  disinvestment  in  labour  arising  from  the
regulations on equal pay in people’s communes9. Agricultural workers may now freely
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dispose  of  their  own  time  and  determine  for  themselves  their  tasks  and  working
practices.
7 At the same time, the restructuring of the pricing system for farm products stimulates
a rise in farm productivity, leading to large numbers of surplus workers being laid off.
The  higher  rates  paid  for  non-agricultural  labour  encourage  country  people  to
migrate10. The reforms have brought about rapid increases in farm production and in
the supply of cereals. The growth in purchasing power makes it possible to buy from
the free markets  in the cities  without needing the urban hukou.  This  development
renders obsolete the rationing system.
8 In former times, when there was rationing, the market was dominated by the sellers (or
producers).  Since the reforms, with an abundance of produce,  the market has been
progressively transformed into a buyers’ market, dominated by consumers. Since 1984,
the food markets have been liberalised. At the same time, urban accommodation is
gradually becoming marketable. Such changes give peasants the opportunity freely to
enter the city and live there without changing their hukou. As the state continues its
withdrawal from different sectors of the economy, an urban labour market is emerging.
Migrants may seek to earn a living in the cities. Furthermore, as urban infrastructure is
built  up and, with improved living standards,  consumption is diversified, the urban
demand for labour is rising significantly.
9 Lastly, the reforms—and in particular the opening up towards the outside world—have
intensified regional disparities and caused further concentration of the population. The
authorities  have  abandoned  their  former  strategy  of  relatively  balanced  regional
development; now, instead, preference is given to the great coastal cities. This policy
has  at  the  same  time  led  to  discrepancies  between  incomes  and  consumption;  in
particular,  it  helps to increase the income gap between rural  and urban areas11.  In
overall terms, inequality of income can be separated into three elements: inequality
within urban areas, inequality within country areas and inequality between urban and
country  areas.  In  China,  the  last  element  overshadows  the  other  two12.  In  1995,
inequality  between  urban  and  rural  communities  amounted  to  more  than  half  the
overall equality of income. Its development accounted for 75% of the development of
overall inequality over the period 1984-1995. The gap between urban and rural incomes
widened until 1978, then narrowed between 1978 and 1984, before increasing again13.
The ratio of average urban income to average rural income per head fell between 1978
and 1985 from 2.57 to 1.86; it rose by 1994 to 2.86; since then it has fluctuated between
2.50 and 2.9014.
10 In the coastal provinces of the south-east, the success of the policy of openness, the
rapid economic development and above all the massive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
combine  to  accelerate  migration15.  The  creation  of  Special  Economic  Zones  and
Economic Zones open to the outside world gives concrete expression to the special
treatment  accorded  to  foreign  investors.  Activity  in  these  zones  is  dominated  by
exports  in  the  labour-intensive  sectors.  This  exogenous  influence  has  strongly
increased the demand for labour, thus pulling in a growing number of migrants from
other provinces.
11 Migrations  between  China’s  provinces  are  mainly  motivated  by  socio-economic
disparities, these in turn brought about by the strategy for unbalanced development
adopted by the authorities16. Moreover, the divergence of incomes observable since the
reforms began in 1978 is caused by the obstacles to trade exchanges between provinces.
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Because of strong demographic pressure on arable land, rural incomes are still at a very
low level.  Farmers  have good reason for  wishing to  leave the land.  The significant
incomes gap between urban and rural areas, as well as that between coastal and inland
regions,  encourage  migration.  According  to  classical  theory  on  development
economics17, migration is essentially the workers’ response to better job prospects, or
more exactly to the prospect of higher incomes. The combination of growing freedom
for  individuals  and  regional  imbalances  has  led,  ever  since  the  1980s,  to  vast
spontaneous movements of farm workers towards the towns: these have progressively
broken down the constraints on migration.
12 The state’s capacity to control migration into the cities has been lessened. Admittedly,
there has been no major change in the hukou system; the adjustments to it during the
1980s and 1990s consisted merely in relaxing the regulations on converting a rural
hukou into an urban hukou.  This  process,  called nongzhuanfei,  is  nevertheless  still
subject  to  quotas.  The  rural/urban  classification  of  the  registration  system  is  still
unchanged; and a person’s socio-economic integration remains dependant on his or her
hukou.
13 Yet, the economic reforms have changed the overall control structure of the economy
in which the hukou system operates. They have weakened control over the mobility of
the  population.  The  state  has  withdrawn from the  allocation  of  jobs  and from the
distribution of consumer goods. Thus, while the nature of the hukou system has never
altered,  its  importance  has  greatly  diminished  inasmuch  as  its  restrictive  aspect
depended on its close link with the rationing system. As rationing collapsed and the
economy developed into a market, the system requiring people to register their civic
status has progressively been stripped of its connection to jobs or social security. Its
application is confined to the registration of citizens. In fact, the impact of this system
on migration has become negligible; and fewer and fewer peasants trouble to convert
their rural hukou into an urban one.
14 Although food shortages are in the past and economic liberalisation is advancing, the
government  still  controls  migration  towards  the  cities.  It  has  three  main  reasons.
Firstly, city people do not wish to share their relatively high standard of living with
country  people.  Secondly,  urban infrastructure  cannot  support  a  massive  inflow of
people coming in from the countryside.  And lastly,  because of  the reforms to state
enterprises, urban areas are also faced with significant unemployment. The restrictions
to  migration  between  provinces  in  China  reflect  the  authorities’  preferences  as  to
where migrants should go;  they are afraid that the incoming flow of migrants may
worsen the employment conditions and pay levels of unskilled workers and endanger
the security of urban residents.
Migratory flows
15 Our study of the dynamic of migratory flows from rural areas towards the cities is
based on data from the population censuses of 1990 and 2000 and from a 1995 survey of
one hundredth of the population18. This is official data and does not take account of
illegal migration, on which practically no information is available. These three series of
data give us the usual place of residence at the time of the census (July 1st 1990 and
1995 and December 1st 2000) as well as the usual place of residence over the previous
five years. The usual place of residence is defined as residence for at least a year in the
data from 1990 and 1995, and as residence for at least six months in data from 2000.
These  figures  enable  us  to  compare  migratory  flows  between provinces  during  the
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period 1985-1990 with those of 1990-1995. Specifying the usual place of residence helps
us to identify rural people and urban people.  Thus,  the data distinguishes between:
urban district (jiedao), township (zhen) and village (xiang). The urban districts are the
constituencies within municipalities or big cities. The townships are the constituencies
within small towns. The first two categories correspond to urban areas and the third to
rural areas.  The migrant is defined as a person whose place of residence five years
before the census is different from that on the date of the census, in regard to the
county (W, xian) or to the municipality within a prefecture (xianjishi), or in regard to
the municipality within a province (dijishi). The migratory flows are broken down into
several types, according to whether they take place within a single province or between
two separate provinces, and according to whether they are between urban or country
areas.
16 The data is limited in three respects. Firstly, it registers migrations over a period of five
years  without  indicating the  date.  It  is  possible  that  some people  migrated several
times,  but  we  know  only  the  place  from  which  they  first  set  off  and  their  final
destination.  Secondly,  neither the 1990 census nor the 1995 survey take account of
migrations within the counties (xian)19. In China, the xian is, from an administrative
point of view, relatively independent and autonomous, with a complete administrative
system. Migrations where the migrant leaves the xian are frequently more formal and
permanent  moves.  The  fifth  population  census,  in  2000,  altered  the  definition  of
migration. Instead of defining it at the xian level, the migrant is defined as one who has
changed his or her place of residence at the lowest level, townships or villages, during
the period 1995-2000. So the definition of migration has been widened. This explains in
large part the 50% increase in the figure for migrations within provinces, which rose
from 22 million people over the periods 1985-1990 and 1990-1995 to 33 million between
1995  and  2000.  On  the  other  hand,  this  change  should  not  affect  the  figures  for
migrations between provinces. Thirdly, the 2000 census, when referring to the rural or
urban dimension of migration, notes only the migrant’s starting-point—and ignores the
destination. So it is no longer possible to examine migratory flows between countryside
and cities. Furthermore, Tibet was not covered by the 1990 census thus no information
is available to us on migrations into or out of that province for the period 1985-1990.
17 The migratory flows measured by the censuses are very significant, and they increase
sharply over the most recent period. Table 1 gives the total number of migrations as
well as the figure for those between provinces, which rose to 32% between 1985 and
1995, falling back to 27% over the period 1995-2000.
 
1. Migratory Flows
18 While the total  number of  migrations (rising from 33 million to 122 million people
between 1990-1995 and 1995-2000) is directly linked to the change in definition, the
increase  observed  for  migrations  between  provinces  is  mainly  explained  by  the
Country People Moving to the Cities: The Migratory Dynamic
China Perspectives, 62 | november - december 2005
5
relaxation  of  restrictions  to  rural  workers’  mobility.  Migratory  flows  between
provinces  thus  tripled  over  the  five  most  recent  years  compared  with  the  earlier
periods. This increase owes more to migrations originating in the countryside (which
went up from 7.8 to 25.6 million, that is, they increased by 3.3 times) than to those
originating in urban areas (up by 2.5 times).
19 Our examination of migratory flows from rural areas to urban areas is confined to the
periods 1985-1995, inasmuch as the last census provides a breakdown only according to
the place of origin. For the period 1995-2000, the only migratory definition we know is
in terms of the starting-point. Table 2 brings out the growing importance of migratory
flows between rural areas. This phenomenon is linked to the industrialisation of the
countryside  and  to  increasing  strength  of  township  and  village  enterprises  (TVEs,
xiangzhen  qiye).  Thus,  over  the  period  1985-1990,  whereas  three  million  people
changed their place of residence in the countryside while staying in the same province,
nearly  4.3  million  made  that  choice  over  the  following  period.  The  increase  in
migrations between country areas and between provinces is even more striking, going
up from 1.8 to 4.3 million people. Economic dynamism in the countryside thus acted as
a brake on the rural exodus.
20 2. Migrations within and between provinces
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3. Breakdown of migrations by rural people between the coast and the interior
21 The regional breakdown of migratory flows, making a distinction between the interior
and  the  coast, is  based  on  the  classic  hypothesis  that  inland  provinces  are  being
marginalised. Indeed, they have for a long time experienced more difficult conditions
for economic development and have frequently been neglected and even discriminated
against by the central government20. With the aim of putting the 1995-2000 data into
perspective, Table 4 gives details about migrations between provinces; it specifies the
location, inland or coastal, of rural migrants’ village of origin; but it does not specify
whether their destinations were rural or urban.
 
4. Breakdown of migrations between provinces originatingin the countryside
22 Whereas,  over  the period 1985-1990,  migrations from inland provinces  towards the
coast amounted to 31% of migrations from the countryside, the proportion increased
subsequently:  it  reached  47%  over  the  period  1990-1995,  and  62%  over  the  period
1995-2000 (in numbers of people, 16.1 million out of 25.6 million). During the full 15
years (1985-2000), migrations between inland provinces estimated as a proportion of all
rural  departures  fell  back  from  31%  to  16%,  whereas  that  for  migrations  between
coastal provinces dropped from 25% to 17% of the total. So it is evident that, in the
context of migrations between provinces and of rural origin, the trend is for migrants
to move from inland provinces towards the coast.
23 The availability of data for the provinces as a whole makes possible a finer analysis,
going beyond a simple distinction between the interior and the coast. Table 5 sets out
the main demographic and economic features of the Chinese provinces in 1990 and
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2000.  More  than  two-thirds  of  the  population  live  in  the  countryside.  The  most
populous regions lie along the plains of the Yangtze (Sichuan, Hubei and Anhui) and
the Yellow River (Henan and Shaanxi). Henan, the second most populous province, is
also a predominantly rural province. The inhabitants of Sichuan and Henan are, on the
face of it, logical candidates for migration towards the cities. 
24 In  the  extreme west  of  China,  neither  the  landscape,  with  its  mountains  and  high
plateaux,  nor the climate are propitious to agriculture.  The province of  Xinjiang is
slightly  more  populous  because  the  presence  of  mineral  resources  in  the  subsoil
dictates a supply of manpower to extract them. This wealth explains the relatively high
rate of urbanisation and the inflow of migrants.
 
5. Features of the Chinese provinces
25 On the coast, where much of the population is concentrated, the urban fabric is very
dense. Shanghai is China’s most densely populated city with 2,179 inhabitants to the
square kilometre in 1990. The many coastal metropolises of Shandong, Guangdong and
Jiangsu provinces act as magnets upon the inhabitants of the countryside nearby.
26 The data on migrant inflows and outflows for each of the provinces over the periods
1985-1990 and 1990-1995 are reported in Tables 6 and 7. The first three columns deal
with  all  migrations,  while  distinguishing  between  flows  coming  in  and  going  out,
within or between provinces. Columns 4 to 6 provide comparable data, but only for
rural-urban migrations. The last two columns define rural-urban migrations between
provinces as a proportion of all migrations between provinces: percentages are given
for migrants coming in and migrants going out.
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6. Migratory flows from the countryside into tthe cities between 1985 and 1990
 
7. Migratory Flows from the countryside into the cities between 1990 and 1985
27 The areas of Guangdong, Peking and Shanghai may be clearly identified as attractive
for rural-urban migration. Conversely, the provinces of Zhejiang, Guangxi and Sichuan
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stand out as the main departure points. While the net migration from them was lower
over the 1990-1995 period than over the previous five years (a sign that departures
were  on the  rise  in  other  provinces),  the  attractiveness  of  Guangdong,  Peking  and
Shanghai seems to have been growing. The cumulative net migration of these provinces
rose from 1.3 to 1.9 million people. 
28 It is interesting to concentrate more specifically on the thirty most significant rural-
urban migratory flows between provinces during these two periods reported in Table 8.
 
8. Principal Migratory Flows from the Countryside to the Cities and between Provinces
29 The first distinguishing characteristic is the existence of a proximity effect. Migrations
between neighbouring provinces are far more usual than more distant migrations. This
characteristic supports the hypothesis that the greater the distance,  the higher the
costs  of  migration  will  be  and  the  less  information  will  be  available.  Migrations
between Chinese regions, just like international migrations, are attended by costs both
psychological (separation) and financial (travelling expenses, phone charges, and the
additional accommodation, health or education costs described earlier). 
30 Empirical  study  of  the  costs  of  migration  has  established  that  they  increase  with
distance, and are accompanied by a deterioration in the migrants’ contacts and support
networks 21. The explanation for this is that the networks are often defined by earlier
migration flows. Costs are lower for individuals who follow in the steps of previous
migrants and settle in communities―built up by former migrations of friends or family
members―in which they have connections.
31 The second distinction is that migrations within provinces are far more common than
those  between  provinces.  This  seems  to  confirm  that  there  are  additional  costs
attached to  migrations  between provinces;  and it  confirms the  hypothesis  that  the
networks, institutions and common values that facilitate the passage of people (or the
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passage of goods) are determined, at least partly, by frontiers22. It was in Guangdong,
where the incidence of internal migration is remarkably high, that the opening up of
China  to  the  outside  world  began.  That  province  also  benefited  from  a  range  of
preferential policies. Its orientation towards exports, backed by massive injections of
foreign capital, lent strong stimulus to the development of small towns and to intensive
industrial activity. Such dynamism led to the creation of large numbers of jobs, which
in turn contributed to the mobility of labour within the province. Migratory flows from
the countryside to the cities in the interior of Sichuan, Jiangsu and Henan provinces
were also very high, in conformity with the size of their populations. The attraction
exerted by the provinces of the south-east was intensified during the period 1990-1995,
thanks  to  the  implementation  of  the  reforms  and  to  the  impetus  given  by  Deng
Xiaoping’s tour of the region in 1992. When it comes to the starting point for rural-
urban migrants, the greatest source is Sichuan, the most populous province with 106.4
million inhabitants in 1990. According to some unofficial estimates, more than 5 million
worker-peasants leave that province every year as seasonal migrants. Henan, Guangxi
and Hebei are also significant starting points for long-distance migration. We should
note that farm workers flock not only into the coastal provinces but also into remote
provinces,  such as  Xinjiang,  Yunnan and Heilongjiang,  drawn by the lure of  labour
shortages. The main migratory flows, as illustrated in the previous table, are sourced in
provinces coterminous with a centre of attraction and flow towards that centre. Flows
from Guangxi  towards  Guangdong,  from Jiangsu  towards  Shanghai  and from Hebei
towards Peking demonstrate this pattern.
32 The main rural-urban migrant flows between provinces over the periods 1985-1990 and
1990-1995 are shown in charts 9 and 10. Most migratory flows start out from inland
regions towards coastal regions. Whether one looks at the first period or at the second,
two-thirds  of  migrations  are  directed  towards  coastal provinces.  Migrants  tend  to
favour destinations where they hope to find jobs more easily and to earn higher gross
wages. So access to the market seems to play an important role in migrants’ choices of
where to settle, which demonstrates that the migratory process in China is a response
to centripetal forces.
33 The charts show clearly the forces of attraction exerted by the three municipalities of
provincial rank (Peking, Tianjin and Shanghai) and by Jiangsu and Shandong provinces.
The Pearl River Delta (Guangdong), the Yangtze Delta centred on Shanghai (Shanghai,
Jiangsu and Zhejiang) and the region surrounding the Gulf of Bohai centred on Peking:
these are the three destinations that most migrants favour23. 
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9. Migratory Flows between Provinces, from the Countryside towrds the Cities, 1985-1990
 
10. Migratory Flows between Provinces, from the Countryside towards the cities, 1990-1995
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34 The economic reforms have introduced market mechanisms into the working of the
mobility  of  labour;  this  in  turn  has  weakened  the  hukou  system  and  encouraged
migration.
35 Descriptive  analysis  of  migratory  flows  confirms  that economic  dynamism  and
geographical position are two significant factors influencing the spatial distribution of
migrants in China. Being close to the market centre, and having access to the national
and  international  consumers  in  the  market:  this  appears  to  exert  a  basic  force  of
attraction.  For  enterprises,  it  also  determines  demand  and  thus  their  labour
requirements. The central position of a market determines the job opportunities and
pay  prospects  that  it  offers  to  migrants.  We may  conclude  that,  despite  persistent
restrictions  to  the  mobility  of  labour,  the  migratory  process  is  consistent  with  the
deepening integration of the Chinese domestic market in which poles of concentration
are taking shape. The migrants need to be able to move to the areas where there is
higher pay and better  job prospects  so  that  they can take advantage of  them. The
figures show that migrants are making themselves available by moving to these areas.
Above  all,  this  phenomenon  is  a  necessary  condition  for  a  fragmented  market  to
develop into an integrated one.
36 Translated by Philip Liddell
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RÉSUMÉS
This article examines the migration of rural workers towards the cities in the light of national
data on the two periods 1985-1990 and 1990-1995. It briefly considers the restrictions on workers’
mobility,  focusing  particularly  on  the  main  instrument  of  control,  the  hukou.  The  article
highlights the finding that despite such continuing obstacles to mobility, the migratory dynamic
is consistent with the deepening integration of the Chinese domestic market.
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